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Policy	Indifference	and	Risk	Premiums	We	identify	 indifferent	policies	using	an	exponential	utility	 function	of	wealth	and	the	full	range	of	reasonable	risk	aversion	coefficients,	as	identified	in	Babcock,	Choi,	and	 Feinerman	 (1993).	 For	 each	 risk	 aversion	 coefficient,	 we	 used	 a	 numerical	optimization	 procedure	 to	 identify	 the	 deductible	 guarantee	 that	 makes	 the	representative	farmer	indifferent	to	the	coinsurance	parameters	of	SURE.	We	found	that	the	indifferent	deductible	guarantee	was	quite	stable,	often	varying	by	less	than	0.1%	of	mean	revenues	across	most	of	the	range	of	risk	aversion	coefficients	when	baseline	coverage	was	70%	or	above,	and	by	less	than	0.2%	at	extreme	levels	of	risk	aversion.		
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	 Estimated	 risk	 premiums	 were	 stable	 as	 well,	 and	 small.	 For	 nearly	 all	combinations	 of	 crop,	 county,	 underlying	 coverage,	 and	 risk	 aversion,	 risk	premiums	were	estimated	 to	be	 less	 than	$0.15	per	acre,	and	 in	many	cases	were	less	 than	 $0.05	 per	 acre.	 These	 values	 are	 economically	 insignificant	 when	compared	to	 insurance	policies	with	fair	values	ranging	from	$10	up	to	$100+	per	acre	 in	 some	 high	 revenue	 corn	 counties.	 The	maximum	 risk	 premium	 estimated	was	$0.19	per	acre	 for	DeKalb,	 IL,	where	per	acre	revenues	were	$974.44	and	the	90/60	coinsurance	policy	had	a	fair	value	of	$48.31.	Table	1	below	shows	estimated	means	 and	 standard	 deviations	 of	 revenues	 for	 select	 crops/counties,	 and	 the	highest	 risk	 premium	estimated.	 The	highest	 risk	 premiums	were	 observed	when	risk	aversion	was	sufficient	to	turn	down	a	$100	gamble	with	3:1	odds	of	winning.	
Table	1:	Means,	Standard	Deviations	and	Maximum	Risk	Premiums	Estimated,	
Select	Counties	and	Crops	
County	 Crop	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Max	Risk	Premium	
DeKalb,	IL	 Corn	 $974.44		 $304.25		 $0.19		
McLean,	IL	 Corn	 $1,009.80		 $202.87		 $0.17		
Howard,	NE	 Corn	 $905.61		 $449.42		 $0.13		
Beadle,	SD	 Corn	 $619.02		 $319.81		 $0.06		
Montgomery,	MS	 Cotton	 $942.76		 $512.72		 $0.13		
Hoke,	NC	 Cotton	 $850.92		 $364.65		 $0.12		
Howard,	TX	 Cotton	 $373.59		 $373.89		 $0.01		
Logan,	IL	 Soy	 $697.53		 $198.33		 $0.11		
Sumner,	KS	 Soy	 $395.42		 $306.86		 $0.02		
Sanilac,	MI	 Soy	 $570.16		 $256.83		 $0.06		
Logan,	KY	 Winter	Wheat	 $470.77		 $248.70		 $0.04		
Marion,	OH	 Winter	Wheat	 $449.92		 $165.73		 $0.04		
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